As he embarked on what he called "a journey through history", Justice Chin showed that various sections referred to in laws of the past "do not do away with the right completely but only limit or reduce the extent, like prohibiting the taking (among others) of forest produce from protected forests and from using certain timber as fuel."

He called on the authority, to "ponder carefully when considering future legislation with regard to and which adversely affects native customary rights, in view of Article 13 of the Federal Constitution which states that "No person shall be deprived of property save in accordance with law and "No law shall provide for the compulsory acquisition or use of property without adequate compensation".

"The authority must also take into account Article 5(1) of the Federal Constitution -which provides that: 'No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law'."

He cited several court decisions that held that "right to livelihood" comes under this Article since native customary right can be considered as a "right to livelihood".

It was his finding that: "Thus far, the native customary rights of an Iban to do the things associated with the terms temuda, pulau, and pemakai menoa have not been abolished. They have survived through all those Orders and Ordinances."

In referring to the Sarawak Land Code and the need for registration of lands by the Land Office, and there being no registration of the Plaintiffs' NCR lands, the Judge explained that "the non-registration was due to the fear of the power of that time that registration would result in large areas of Sarawak being claimed by the natives of Sarawak."

"Therefore, the Plaintiffs cannot be faulted for the non-registration of the pemakai menoa under Rule 71 nor for the lack of survey record in the Land Register," he concluded.

Justice Ian Chin also provided ample examples of past rulers of Sarawak holding true to their respect for the natives and customs and the overwhelming evidence of their reaffirmation of native customary rights over land.

Even the enactment of the Sarawak Land Code in 1958 "does not abrogate whatever native customary rights that exist before the passing of that legislation."

"This means the Plaintiffs' native customary rights were unaffected by this legislation except that they can no longer claim new territory even though the families may increase unless they obtain a permit under s10 of that legislation from the Superintendent of Lands & Surveys."

The judge also explained at length, in his judgment, why he found the description of native customary rights as "licences" as "ill fitting".

He further stated that: "While it is correct that the Plaintiffs do not hold any title to the land and may be termed licencees" but their licence, contrary to what Mr. Tan had argued, cannot be terminable at will. Theirs are native customary rights which can only be extinguished in accordance with the laws and this is after payment of compensation."

The judge also referred to the argument that absence of any reference to or mention of the terms pulau or pemakai menoa in the Tusun Tunggu meant that such custom was not native customary law since they do not come within the definition of "customary law" of the Land (Classification) (Amendment) Ordinance 1954.

He quoted Mooney (as Crown counsel) and Hickling, that the law does not in fact give effect to any customs whatsoever except the codified law of the delicts.

The judge wrote in his judgment: "The matters of temuda, pulau and pemakai menoa were already recognised by their being mentioned in the various Orders and reference which I have earlier referred to and therefore the law of Colony has indirectly given effect to them. Native customary law before its codification was not in any legal written form but a matter of proof.

"Therefore, even assuming that those rights of temuda, pulau and pemakai menoa were not expressedly mentioned by any written law, it does not mean that they could not exist as native customary law. They exist, and in this regard I have already adverted to the evidence and found them to exist, until abolished by Orders or other legislation for which also I have concluded that they had not abolished those native customary rights which are also equated as native customary laws."

Summing up, the judge declared: "… the Plaintiffs' right of temuda, pulau and pemakai menoa had survived all the Orders and legislation. They were exercised in the disputed area by the Plaintiffs and their ancestors until they were prevented to do so by the total destruction of the trees by the Defendants for the purpose of planting pulp trees after the issuance of the titles by the 3rd Defendant to the 1st Defendant."